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Abstract. This paper models the emergence of retail clusters on a
supply chain network comprised of suppliers, retailers, and consumers.
Firstly, an agent-based model is proposed to investigate retail location
distribution in a market of two complementary goods. The methodology
controls for supplier locales and unit sales prices of retailers and suppli-
ers, and a consumer’s willingness to patronize a retailer depends on the
total travel distance of buying both goods. On a circle comprised of dis-
crete locations, retailers play a non-cooperative game of location choice
to maximize individual proﬁts. Our ﬁndings suggest that the probabil-
ity distribution of the number of clusters in equilibrium follows power
law and that hierarchical distribution patterns are much more likely to
occur than the spread-out ones. In addition, retailers of complementary
goods tend to co-locate at supplier locales. Sensitivity tests on the num-
ber of retailers are also performed. Secondly, based on the County Busi-
ness Patterns (CBP) data of Minneapolis-St. Paul from US Census 2000
database, we ﬁnd that the number of clothing stores and the distribution
of food stores at the zip code level follows power-law distribution.
Keywords: clustering, agent-based model, location choice, distribution
pattern.
1 Introduction
In economic geography, clusters are geographical agglomerations of ﬁrms with
similar or complementary capabilities [1]. Geographical clusters of business lo-
cations have been prominent phenomena in almost all countries and regions.
Global integration increasingly contributes to regional specialization, with de-
creasing transportation costs and trade barriers enabling ﬁrms to closely interact
with other ﬁrms to beneﬁt from local economies of scale [2,3].
An early investigation of clustering was performed by Marshall [4], who argued
that while ﬁrms are directly connected through business exchange, they are also
indirectly linked through competition for labor and production factors, and that
clustering of locations represented the distribution of economic activities. Weber
[5] proposed a theory of industrial location where industrial organizations locate
to minimize transportation costs of raw materials and ﬁnal product. Christaller,
J. Zhou (Ed.): Complex 2009, Part I, LNICST 4, pp. 175–187, 2009.
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in his central place theory [6], indicated that the eﬀects of market threshold
and consumers’ preferences in terms of range of patronizing lead to a system of
central places, wherein each center supplies certain types of products forming
levels of hierarchy. Krugman [7] asserted that the geographical distribution of
ﬁrms is balanced by centripetal and centrifugal forces. The centripetal forces
entice ﬁrms to cluster, and the centrifugal forces cause ﬁrms to scatter.
The mechanism of business clustering has gained increasing attention. Porter
[8] formulated a diamond model to identify the mechanism of fostering industrial
dynamism and long-term development. Levinson and Krizek [9] proposed four
factors impacting a ﬁrm’s decision of where to locate on a spatially-structured
supply chain networks: complementors, competitors, connectors, and customers,
which comprised the diamond of exchange. Huang and Levinson [10] studied
retail location choice on a supply chain network of one product and found that
diﬀerent numbers of competitors and transportation can lead to diﬀerent retail
distribution patterns.
Hierarchical distributions of resources and economic activities have been
widespread in almost every city, region, and nation. Power-law distributions
have been found to well ﬁt many natural and social phenomena, such as the
population of cities [12], distribution of land uses [13], and the number of cita-
tions received by published academic papers [14]. Zipf [15] proposed that city
sizes follow a special form of the hierarchical distribution which is latter named
as the Zipf’s law. Gabaix [16] and Ioannide et al. [17] indicated that the rank-
distribution of US cities follows the Zipf’s law. Zipf’s law was also found to ﬁt
the distribution of US ﬁrm sizes and the sales of US manufacturing ﬁrms [18,19].
Similar results are also found for European and Japanese ﬁrms [20,21,22].
Yet human beings are still lacking understanding about the micro-foundations
of the agglomeration of human activities and resources; quantitative theoretical
models that can properly answer the question of how and why clusters emerge
and prosper need to be formulated. Microscopically, clusters form by experienc-
ing a complex and self-organized process in developmental stages, where business
agents are constantly learning and adapting [23]. It is of interest to examine how
individual agents’ seemingly random and chaotic decisions and interactions as a
whole lead to clusters of ﬁrms.
As an extension of Huang and Levinson [10], this research builds an agent-
based model to examine retail location choice on a simpliﬁed supply chain net-
work of suppliers, retailers, and consumers. Retailers maximize proﬁts by lo-
cating, which is modeled as a repetitive game. We are interested in the retail
distribution pattern in equilibrium. It should be noted that this study analyzes
a pure model of agglomeration of ﬁrms without forms of co-operation and other
inter-organizational linkages. The basic assumptions of this model are: (1) Two
categories of products exist in the market; one retailer only sells one category
of products. (2) Each consumer needs both products. (3) Each consumer buys
all needed products of one category from one retail=er in one trip. (4) Con-
sumers share the same utility function, suggesting that they have the same taste
when patronizing retailers. (5) Suppliers of the same product oﬀer the same unitRetail Location Choice with Complementary Goods: An Agent-Based Model 177
sales price and keep their price and locations ﬁxed at all times. (6) Retailers of
the same product have the same ﬁxed unit sales prices. (7) Retailers’ moving is
costless.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes autonomous
players and deﬁnes the concepts of cluster and average cluster density to measure
retail spatial patterns. Section 3 depicts and analyzes the simulation results. Sec-
tion 4 performs sensitivity tests on the number of retailers. Section 5 discusses
the principles of retail location choice. Section 6 analyzes the distribution pat-
terns of clothing stores and food stores in Minneapolis–St. Paul in the state of
Minnesota, United States. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In this section, a multi-agent paradigm is adopted to model a repetitive non-
cooperative game of retail location choice. All players sit on the circle of a ﬁnite
number of uniform locations. This section introduces agents in this model: sup-
pliers, retailers, and consumers. Variables and constants used in this research
are listed in Table 1.
2.1 Consumers
The market has two categories of products x and y, which are sold by two kinds
of retailers. Let Rxi indicate retailer i of product x,a n dRyj indicate retailer j
of product y. Consumers hope to buy both products with minimum cost, which,
in this research, implies minimum total travel distance. A trip is deﬁned as a
round-trip from home to visit Rxi and Ryj. Trips are assumed not to have ﬁxed
costs; only total distance matters. In the scenario of Wx number of Rxi and Wy
number of Ryj, there are in total Wx·Wy trip candidates, from which a consumer
chooses the shortest trip.
Let dpi, dpj,a n ddij respectively denote the shortest distance between con-
sumer p and retailer Rxi, between consumer p and Ryj, and betweenRxi and
Ryj. Since players locate on a circle, it can be easily deduced that dpi, dpj,a n d
dij are larger than or equal to the half of the circle perimeter. Given retailer Rxi
and retailer Ryj, the shortest trip distance dt for consumer p can be calculated
by the following method: if the summation of dpi, dpj,a n ddij is larger than or
equal to the perimeter of the circle where retailers are located, the shortest trip
is the perimeter of the circle. Otherwise, the shortest trip distance equals twice
of the largest value of dpi, dpj,a n ddij.
Consumers are assumed to be homogeneous, sharing the same utility function.






t · πti (1)
Where β is expected to be negative because longer travel distance generally
diminishes consumers’ willingness of patronizing. To account for preferences178 A. Huang and D. Levinson
Table 1. List of Variables
Variables Description
dpi shortest distance between consumer p and retailer Rxi
dpj shortest distance between consumer p and retailer Ryj
Upi consumer p’s utility of partronizing retailer Rxi
πti dummy variable, equaling 1 if Retailer Rxi is included in trip t
dt total travel distance of trip t
bpi binary variable, which equals 1 if consumer p patronizes retailer Rxi
ρpi probability for consumer p to patronize retailer Rxi
ρpm probability for consumer p to patronize a retailer sitting at locale m
mik shortest distance between retailer Rxi and supplier k of product x
Ωim expected proﬁt for retailer Rxi when locating at m
Πi actual proﬁt of retailer Rxi
σmk shortest distance between supplier k and locale m on the circle
lmk binary variable, which equals 1 if a retailer in location m patronizes supplier k
lik binary variable, which equals 1 if retailer Rxi patronizes supplier k
 i number of retailers in cluster i
τi number of locations in cluster i
ϕn mean cluster density of the distribution pattern of n retailers
Constants Description
k1 a constant in consumers’ uitlity function
θ unit retail sales price of product x
χ unit retail y sales price of product y
λx individual customer’s demand on product x
λy individual customer’s demand on product y
u retailers’ unit shipping cost per product
δ unit sales price of suppliers of x
υ unit sales price of suppliers of y
N number of consumers
K number of suppliers of product x
L number of suppliers of product y
Wx number of retailers of product x
Wy number of retailers of product y
C total number of locales on the circle
associated with factors other than traﬃc cost (and thus avoid a determinis-
tic model, which is a special case where travel cost dominates), we use a logit
model in which the probability for a consumer to patronize a retailer depends
on travel cost but has a random component. The probability for consumer p to








Similar formulas can be established for retailer Ryj. It should be noted that
when a consumer’s locale contains both retailers of x and retailers of y, the total
travel distance becomes zero. In reality, there is always some distance between
a consumer’s home and a retail store. Thereby in this case, we set this intra-
zonal distance to be 0.25 of the distance between two adjacent locations on theRetail Location Choice with Complementary Goods: An Agent-Based Model 179
circle, which is a typical empirical value used in regional transportation planning
models.
The Roulette Wheel Selection method is adopted for a consumer to select a
retailer. This approach suggests that a retailer with a larger ρpi for consumer p
has a greater chance to be selected by this consumer. A consumer’s probabilities
of patronizing all retailers comprise his wheel of selection, which is updated
in every round; and a spin of the wheel selects a retailer. The sequence for
consumers to patronize retailers is randomly decided for each round.
2.2 Suppliers
There are two kinds of suppliers which sell product x and product y,w h oa r e
evenly distributed on the circle and are co-located. The model assumes that all
suppliers oﬀer the same unit sales price and can always produce enough goods
to meet market demand. Suppliers locations are ﬁxed in all rounds.
2.3 Retailers
Retailers connect suppliers and consumers on supply chains. Retailers’ initial lo-
cations are randomly assigned. In the beginning of each round, retailers evaluate
expected proﬁts of all locations. For example, retailer Rxi’s expected proﬁt in
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Where
N
p=1 λ·ρim represents total expected sales of products in locale m.T h e
following part in brackets refers to expected proﬁt per product, equaling sales
price minus cost. A retailer’s cost includes the purchasing cost of products from
a supplier and the shipping cost which is proportional to shipping distance and
quantity of products. Here we assume a retailer patronizes the closest supplier.
After evaluating proﬁts of all localities, a retailer moves to the locale that has the
highest expected proﬁt (revenue - cost), given others are geographically ﬁxed at
that time. Each retailer can only move once per round; the sequence for retailers
to move is randomly decided, no matter what products they sell.
After all retailers choose locations, consumers begin to patronize retailers; the
method is introduced in Section 2.1. Retailers’ actual proﬁts are calculated at
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Compared with function (3), the main diﬀerence is the way total sales amount
is calculated, which in this function equals Rxi’s sales price times actual sales
amount at the end of a round. The actual proﬁt and expected proﬁt are diﬀerent
for two reasons: First, actual proﬁt is calculated when all retailers have had an180 A. Huang and D. Levinson
opportunity to relocate, that is at the end of a round, whereas expected proﬁt
may be estimated before other retailers ﬁnd new locations. Second, consumers
patronize retailers stochastically.
2.4 Measuring Spatial Distribution
We measure the number of discrete retail clusters and average cluster density
when a game reaches equilibrium. A cluster is deﬁned as an agglomeration of
retailers that are geographically adjacent or in the same locale of the circle.
Cluster density is calculated as the number of retailers in a cluster divided by
the number of locations in the cluster. The mean average cluster density of n









where τi is the number of locations in cluster i;  i is the number of retailers in
cluster i; M is the total number of clusters.
3 Experiments and Results
In our ﬁrst basic experiment, all agents sit on a circle of 100 uniform discrete
locations, where 5000 consumers are evenly distributed on these locations. A
consumer’s demand on product x is 20 and on product y is 10. First, we examine
the scenario of 5 retailers of x, 5 retailers of product y, 5 suppliers of x,a n d5
suppliers of y. Table 2 shows the values of the parameters used in this experiment.
A game is believed to have achieved an equilibrium when all retailers stay at
their current locales for three consecutive rounds. Since multiple equilibria may
exist in this game, we test 400 diﬀerent retail initial location patterns.
Typically a stable pattern emerges after the ﬁrst round. Our results ﬁnd ﬁve
retail location distribution patterns, which can be grouped into four categories
by the number of clusters (it should be noted that here we consider the geo-
graphical patterns, although each individual retailers’ ﬁnal location may vary in
each game depending on their initial patterns and the sequence of moving). The
Table 2. Value of parameters in the scenario of 10 retailers and 10 suppliers
Parameters value Parameters value
N 5000 k1 1
C 100 χ 2.5
u 0.08 ($) δ 1.5 ($)
υ 1.0 ($) K 5
θ 3.5 L 5
λx 20 Wx 5
λy 10 Wy 5Retail Location Choice with Complementary Goods: An Agent-Based Model 181
Table 3. Probability distribution of the number of clusters and cluster density for the
case of 10 retailers and 10 suppliers
Number of clusters Probability Cluster density Probability
1 0.861 10 0.741
2 0.128 6 0.120
3 0.011 5 0.117
3.3 0.011
3 0.011
probabilities for diﬀerent numbers of clusters and cluster densities are shown
in Table 3. The most common pattern is only one cluster, where all retailers
accumulate at a supplier locale. All the retail distribution patterns share two
features: (1) retailers only stay at supplier locales; (2) the same number of re-
tailers of x and retailers of y co-locate, indicating that they constitute pairs. It is
interesting to notice that the evenly distributed pattern of retailers—every one
retailer of x and every one retailer of y double at a supplier locale—does not
appear in our experiments. To further explore its possibility, we purposely set
the initial distribution pattern to be very similar to the evenly distributed one,
the result of which is that the evenly distributed pattern emerges.
It can be summarized that the hierarchical pattern of one cluster is most com-
mon, while the spread-out patterns with a larger number of clusters are very rare,
whichisthefeatureofpower-lawdistribution.Accordingtothedeﬁnitionofpower-
law distribution, a quantity x follows a power law if its distribution obeys
p(x) ∝ x−α, (6)
where α is the scaling parameter. The logarithmic scale of p(x)a n dx have
the form of a linear relationship with slope −α. Figure 1 shows log-log plots of
Fig.1. Log-log plot showing power-law distributions in the number of clusters for 10
retailers (5 retailers of x and 5 retailers of y), where α =3 . 8 3182 A. Huang and D. Levinson
Fig.2. Log-log plot showing power-law distributions in the number of clusters for the
scenarios of 6, 8, 12, and 18 retailers in total, where the number of retailers of x equals
the number of retailers of y
probability distribution of the number of clusters in our result. The model ﬁt
test conﬁrms our hypothesis of power law; α is estimated to be 3.83 through
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
4 Sensitivity Tests on the Number of Retailers
Our sensitivity tests investigate diﬀerent numbers of retailers. First, presumably
having the same number of retailers of x and retailers of y,w ee x a m i n et h e
scenarios with total number of retailers respectively equaling 4, 6, 8, 10, 12,
14, 16, 18, and 20. 100 diﬀerent retail initial location patterns are examined
for each scenario; other conditions are the same as the ﬁrst experiment. The
experimental results disclose that the probabilities of the numbers of clusters in
all these cases follow power-law distributions. The pattern of one cluster at a
supplier locale has the highest probability to appear; in addition, each cluster
contains the same number of retailers of x and retailers of y. Figure 2 shows the
probability distribution for the scenarios of 6, 8, 12, 18 retailers.
Second, we also examine the scenarios where the number of retailers of x
and retailers of y are not equal. We set the number of retailers of x to be 5,
and run the number of retailers of y from 4 to 9; each case are tested with 100
diﬀerent retail initial location patterns. The results, as shown in Figure 3, also
indicate that hierarchical patterns emerge with a high probability. The proba-
bility distributions of the numbers of resultant clusters are all found to well ﬁt
the power-law distribution. Table 4 displays the estimated exponent α for the
scenarios of various numbers of retailers. It is disclosed that controlling for theRetail Location Choice with Complementary Goods: An Agent-Based Model 183
Fig.3. Log-log plot showing power-law distributions in the number of clusters for the
scenarios where the number of retailers of x equals 5 and the number of retailers of y
respectively equals 4, 6, and 8. When the number of retailers of y equals 6, α = 2.27;
when the number of retailers of y equals 6, α = 4.11; when the number of retailers of
y equals 6, α = 4.03.
Table 4. Estimated exponent α for diﬀerent numbers of retailers












number of retailers of x, as the number of retailers of y increases, the scaling
parameter becomes larger, meaning that the slope of the power-law trend line
gets steeper. Additionally, the values of the scaling parameter in the cases of
diﬀerent numbers of retailers of x and y tend to be larger than those of the
scenarios with the same number of retailers of x and y.
5 Discussion
Our experiments illustrate some principles for retail location choice in our model:
1. Pairing of retailers of complementary goods. Ceteris paribus, a retailer is
more likely to move to a locale with more retailers of complementary goods.184 A. Huang and D. Levinson
2. Staying close to suppliers. Retailers all co-locate with suppliers to reduce
transportation cost.
3. Avoiding direct competition. All else equal, retailers choose places whose
neighborhood has a lower density of retailers of the same product to avoid
direct competition.
If there is only one product in the market, such hierarchical patterns cannot
be stable in that some retailers in a big cluster can easily move to an open
space on the circle to occupy a larger market [10]. In this model, however, since
consumers consider total travel distance of buying both goods, retailers’ location
choice depends not only on their distance to suppliers and consumers, but also
on the locations of retailers of complementary goods. Our results discover that a
retailer does not unilaterally move to a new locale unless it can pair with another
retailer of complementary goods there.
In the central place theory, Christaller [6] claimed that in the areas with
evenly-distributed population and resources, settlements have equidistant spac-
ing between centers of the same order; high-order services are farther away
from low-order services. Yet this research reveals that even in a market of two
equally important products, hierarchical distribution patterns can autonomously
emerge. This comports with the notion of retail districts found in many cities
[9], such as the Kappabashi district of Tokyo specializing in kitchen equipment
(and plastic sushi) along with similar examples of clustered competitors. In this
model, although the even distribution pattern of retailers can occur under cer-
tain circumstances, to acheive this each cluster needs almost the same timing
to emerge, which has a high requirement for retail initial distribution conditions
and the sequence of location choice. Thereby it is much more diﬃcult to emerge
than the hierarchical ones.
6 Retail Geographical Distribution in the Twin Cities
Based on the County Business Patterns (CBP) data from the US Census 2000
database, we further examine the retail geographical distribution patterns in
the Twin Cities. Each zip code area is considered as a cluster. Two categories
of retailers are selected according to the 6-digit NAICS code. One category is
food and beverage stores, including supermarkets and other grocery (except con-
venience) stores (445110) and convenience stores (445120); we believe products
in this category are complementary to each other. The other category is cloth-
ing and clothing accessories stores, which include: mens clothing stores (448110),
womens clothing stores (448120), childrens and infants’ clothing stores (448130),
family clothing stores (448140), other clothing stores (448190), and shoe stores
(448210); the commodities from these stores are also complementary.
Fig.4 presents the cumulative distribution for the number of food and bever-
age store establishments. The distribution ﬁts the power law with an R-square
of 0.94, and the scaling parameter is estimated to be 1.10. Fig. 5 shows theRetail Location Choice with Complementary Goods: An Agent-Based Model 185
Fig.4. The cumulative distribution for the number of food and beverage stores by zip
code in the Twin Cities, MN in 2000. The scaling parameter is estimated to be 1.10.
Fig.5. The cumulative distribution for the number of clothing and accessories stores
by zip code in the Twin Cities, MN in 2000. The scaling parameter is estimated to be
0.45.
cumulative distribution for the number of clothing and clothing accessories
stores. Its distribution is power law with a kink in the curve; the MLE method
estimates the scaling parameter to be 0.45. Such ﬁndings can be seen as empir-
ical evidence of hierarchical distribution patterns of retailers of complementary
goods.186 A. Huang and D. Levinson
7 Conclusions
Geographical clusters have received great attention in recent years, yet the mech-
anism of clustering of business activities has not been fully understood.
This paper proposes an agent-based model to examine retail location choice
in a market of complementary goods. This model considers the impact of both
market demand and transportation cost. Our results ﬁnd autonomous emergence
of retail clusters; the hierarchical distribution patterns (in particular, the pattern
of only one cluster) appear with a high probability. The probability distributions
of the number of retail clusters follows power laws. It should be noted that this
occurs with only a single mechanism (trip chaining for complementary goods
on the part of the customer), and other mechanisms (such as the desire of cus-
tomers to comparison shop) are not required to produce clusters, but may also
be additional source of clustering behavior. In addition, based on the US Census
data in 2000, we ﬁnd that the retail distribution patterns of retailers of food
stores and clothing stores by zip code follow power laws.
Retail location choice is a process involving balancing many diﬀerent factors,
such as distance to suppliers, distance to its complementary goods, and distance
to direct competition. This research discloses that co-locating of retailers of
complementary goods is a striking phenomenon. In addition, retailers settle down
at their supplier locales to minimize transportation cost.
The framework of this model can be extended in the following aspects. Factors
such as price, brand, product quality, word of mouth, and considerations about
scheduling can impact consumers’ choice of retailers. The model can incorporate
mechanism by which retailers can compete by adjusting sales price and quality.
Land price and local wage price also aﬀect retailers’ cost. Another intriguing
future work is to examine this model in the context of a more general grid
network, which requires modifying the rule of calculating travel distance and
transportation cost. Also, it would be of interest to relax the assumption that
one retailer can only sell one category of products; the model will better reﬂect
the reality if retailers can autonomously decide whether to specialize or expand
their scope.
In empirical studies, it is worthwhile to further consider what the proper
level should be to examine the distribution of retailers. Most studies categorize
industries and plants into politically deﬁned regions such as states, counties,
Metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), and zip code areas. While they can be
meaningful indicators of clusters, clusters that are on the edges of several adja-
cent counties or zip code areas are not properly measured by looking from the
county or zip code level.
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